Treatment strategies for sheep scab: An economic model of farmer behaviour by Nixon, Emily J et al.
                          Nixon, E., Rose, H., & Wall, R. (2017). Treatment strategies for sheep scab:
an economic model of farmer behaviour. Preventive Veterinary Medicine,
137(A), 43-51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2016.12.015
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY
Link to published version (if available):
10.1016/j.prevetmed.2016.12.015
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Elsevier at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167587716302719 . Please refer to any applicable terms of
use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
T
b
E
V
a
A
R
R
A
K
S
P
G
F
P
D
1
i
t
e
s
a
r
p
h
0Preventive Veterinary Medicine 137 (2017) 43–51
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Preventive  Veterinary  Medicine
j o ur na l ho me  page: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /prevetmed
reatment  strategies  for  sheep  scab:  An  economic  model  of  farmer
ehaviour
mily  J.  Nixon ∗,  Hannah  Rose  Vineer,  Richard  Wall
eterinary Parasitology and Ecology Group, University of Bristol, Bristol Life Sciences Building, 24 Tyndall Avenue, Bristol, BS8 1TQ, United Kingdom
 r  t  i  c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 23 August 2016
eceived in revised form 11 October 2016
ccepted 22 December 2016
eywords:
heep scab
soroptes ovis
ame theory
armer decision-making
rophylaxis
isease management
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Ovine  psoroptic  mange  (sheep  scab)  is  a  debilitating  and  damaging  condition  caused  by a  hypersensitivity
reaction  to the  faecal  material  of  the  parasitic  mite  Psoroptes  ovis. Farmers  incur  costs  from  the  use  of
prophylactic  acaricides  and, if  their sheep  become  infected,  they  incur  the  costs  of therapeutic  treatment
plus  the economic  loss from  reduced  stock  growth,  lower  reproductive  rate,  wool  loss  and  hide  damage.
The unwillingness  of  farmers  to use  routine  prophylactic  treatment  has  been  cited as  a primary  cause
of  the  growing  incidence  of  sheep  scab  in the  United  Kingdom  (UK)  since  the  disease  was  deregulated
in  1992.  However,  if farmers  behave  rationally  from  an  economic  perspective,  the  optimum  strategy
that  they  should  adopt  will  depend  on the  risk  of  infection  and  the relative  costs  of prophylactic  versus
therapeutic  treatment,  plus  potential  losses.  This  calculation  is also  complicated  by the fact  that  the
risk of infection  is  increased  if  neighbours  have  scab  and  reduced  if neighbours  treat  prophylactically.
Hence,  for  any  farmer,  the  risk  of  infection  and  optimum  approach  to treatment  is also  contingent  on
the  behaviour  of  neighbours,  particularly  when  common  grazing  is  used.  Here,  the  relative  economic
costs  of  different  prophylactic  treatment  strategies  are  calculated  for upland  and  lowland  farmers  and
a  game  theory  model  is  used  to evaluate  the  relative  costs  for a farmer  and  his/her  neighbour  under
different  risk scenarios.  The  analysis  shows  that  prophylaxis  with  organophosphate  (OP)  dipping  is  a  cost
effective  strategy,  but  only  for upland  farmers  where  the  risk  of infection  is  high.  In all  other  circumstances
prophylaxis  is  not  cost  effective  relative  to  reliance  on  reactive  (therapeutic)  treatment.  Hence,  farmers
adopting  a reactive  treatment  policy  only,  are  behaving  in  an economically  rational  manner.  Prophylaxis
and  cooperation  only  become  economically  rational  if  the  risk  of  scab  infection  is  considerably  higher than
the  current  national  average,  or the  cost  of treatment  is  lower.  Should  policy  makers  wish  to reduce  the
national  prevalence  of scab,  economic  incentives  such  as subsidising  the cost  of  acaricides  or  rigorously
applied  ﬁnancial  penalties,  would  be  required  to make  prophylactic  treatment  economically  appealing
to  individual  farmers.  However,  such  options  incur  their  own  infrastructure  and  implementation  costs
for central  government.
©  2017  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license. Introduction
Ovine psoroptic mange (sheep scab) is a debilitating and damag-
ng condition caused by a severe hypersensitivity reaction in sheep
o the faecal material of the parasitic mite, Psoroptes ovis (Burgess
t al., 2012). Clinical signs include dermatitis, intense pruritus and
elf-trauma (Berriatua et al., 2001). Sheep scab infection leads to
 lower reproductive rate (Fthenakis et al., 2000), weight loss or
educed weight gain (Kirkwood, 1980; Rehbein et al., 2000a), wool
Abbreviations: UK, United Kingdom; ML,  macrocyclic lactone; OP, organophos-
hate.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Emily.Nixon@bristol.ac.uk (E.J. Nixon).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2016.12.015
167-5877/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
loss (Rehbein et al., 2000b), additional food and acaricide costs
(ADAS, 2013) higher labour costs (ADAS, 2008) and, in some cases,
stock mortality (Roberts et al., 1971).
Before its deregulation in the UK, it was compulsory to treat
all sheep prophylactically and by 1988 when twice yearly immer-
sion dipping was enforced, there were fewer than 40 reported
outbreaks per year (French et al., 1999). Following deregulation
in 1992, many farmers abandoned prophylactic treatment, par-
ticularly with organophosphate insecticides (French et al., 1994;
Bisdorff and Wall, 2008). Subsequently, the prevalence of scab
increased by two orders of magnitude (Bisdorff et al., 2006; Bisdorff
and Wall, 2008). Within the headline ﬁgure for national prevalence,
there are signiﬁcant regional variations in scab prevalence, with
a study by Rose, (2011) showing 13.9% of ﬂocks experiencing at
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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east one outbreak per year in the uplands of Great Britain and 5.2%
n the lowlands. The uplands are comprised of Scotland (average
cab prevalence 7.1%), Northern England (14.1%) and Wales (20.5%)
hile the lowlands include Central England (3.3%), East England
5.9%) and South West England (6.4%). The regional differences in
cab prevalence have been attributed to the greater use of common
razing in upland areas, since unrestricted mixing of animals facil-
tates transmission from infected to uninfected animals and makes
rompt disease management more difﬁcult (Rose and Wall, 2012).
The cost of sheep scab in Great Britain was estimated at £8.3 mil-
ion per year (Nieuwhof and Bishop, 2005), although the true cost
s likely to be higher since this estimate did not include the cost
f labour, subclinical disease, or ineffective treatments. Costs are
ncurred because farmers are legally obliged to treat ﬂocks visibly
nfected with scab with approved acaricides and from the economic
oss of the reduced reproductive rate, weight, wool and skin loss
f their infected livestock. Farmers also incur costs if they treat
heir sheep prophylactically with acaricides to prevent scab. The
apid increase in the prevalence of sheep scab in the UK follow-
ng deregulation and the apparent inability to control this disease
n the UK has been attributed to the fact that many farmers are
nwilling to use prophylactic management given a perceived rela-
ively low probability of infection (ADAS, 2008). As a result various
heep scab management initiatives have been launched to attempt
o encourage more proactive treatment approaches (ADAS, 2008).
There are two primary prophylactic treatments for scab pre-
ention currently licensed in the UK: a long-acting injectable
ormulation of the macrocyclic lactone (ML) moxidectin and the
rganophosphate (OP) Diazinon, used as a total-immersion plunge
ip (Sargison et al., 2007). When used prophylactically, a single
njection of long-acting 2% moxidectin can provide protection for
p to 60 days (NOAH, 2014). Diazinon plunge dip confers protection
or up to 63 days (Kirkwood and Quick, 1981). The same prod-
cts can be used reactively to treat scab, as well as a range of
ther macrocyclic lactone products with relatively shorter periods
f residual activity.
From a purely economic perspective, a farmer’s optimum strat-
gy for scab control depends on the balance between the cost of
reventative treatment (if used) and the loss in production plus
he cost of reactive treatment under different risks of scab. There
ay  also be infrastructure costs, for example dip baths, for some
pproaches to scab treatment. This calculation is also complicated
y the fact that the risk of infection is higher if neighbours have
cab and lower if neighbours treat prophylactically; having neigh-
ours with scab has been estimated to increase the chances of scab
nfection by 10 times in upland ﬂocks (Rose and Wall, 2012). If a
armer’s neighbour treats prophylactically for scab, this reduces the
isk of the farmer’s ﬂock getting scab and reduces the need to use
rophylaxis. In contrast, if the neighbour’s sheep become infected
ith scab, the higher infection risk increases the beneﬁts of pro-
hylaxis. Hence, for any farmer, the risk of infection and optimum
pproach to treatment is contingent on the behaviour of neigh-
ours, particularly when contact between ﬂocks is likely, as when
ommon grazing is used.
Farmers do not necessarily have access to information about
heir neighbour’s strategy or about the costs and risks of scab to
id their decision-making process. However, the use of the mathe-
atical Game Theory approach, as conceived by von Neumann and
orgenstern (1944), allows the determination of an economic opti-
um  strategy for a farmer based on probability, without knowledge
f the neighbour’s strategy. Game Theory depicts two  or more
ndividuals (players) who will make choices that maximise their
ersonal payoff, that is, they are rational (Myerson, 1991). The
ndividual does not know what the other player (in this case the
eighbour) will decide to do, however, the other player’s actions
ffect disease incidence and infection risk (Shim et al., 2012). Gamey Medicine 137 (2017) 43–51
Theory in a human public health context has been used to model
responses to a number of infectious diseases, for example Rubella
(Shim et al., 2009) and Inﬂuenza (Galvani et al., 2007). In addition,
it has been applied to epidemiological studies of animal health,
for example toxoplasmosis in cats (Sykes and Rychtar, 2015). The
aim of this study was to use a Game Theory model to explore the
relative economic costs and beneﬁts of different strategies when
making individual decisions to treat prophylactically or reactively
for sheep scab.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Model construction and assumptions
A deterministic Game Theory model was constructed in
Microsoft
®
Excel (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA,  USA) to
determine the optimum sheep scab control strategy (to treat or not
treat prophylactically) for a farmer in relation to the behaviour of
his/her closest neighbour. It is assumed that a farmer has only one
neighbour and so the game involves two  players, a farmer (known
as Farmer) and his/her neighbour (Neighbour). Both players are
assumed to be economically rational, that is, they are motivated
solely by proﬁt and not by any other factors. They simultaneously
decide whether or not to treat their ﬂocks prophylactically for
sheep scab. Four scenarios of prophylactic treatment are possible:
Farmer and Neighbour treat, Farmer treats and Neighbour does not,
Neighbour treats and Farmer does not and neither treat. For all sce-
narios it is assumed that both farmers have the same ﬂock size and
that, if they both treat, they will use the same form of treatment. In
all scenarios, both farmers apply a reactive, therapeutic treatment
in the event of an infection. Every run of the model generates eight
costs, one for each farmer during the four possible prophylactic
treatment scenarios.
The cost to Farmer/Neighbour per year when both farmers treat
prophylactically (Ctt) is the cost of prophylaxis per ewe  (and her
lambs) (PC) plus the product of the probability that a farmer’s ﬂock
may  get scab despite the fact that both farmers treat prophylacti-
cally (Ptt) and the costs and losses per ewe  (and her lambs) incurred
if the ﬂock does get scab (L), all multiplied by the number of ewes
in the ﬂock (Ne).
Ctt = Ne · (PC + (L · Ptt) (1)
The cost to Farmer/Neighbour per year when they do not treat
prophylactically but the other player does (Cntt) is the product of
the probability that the ﬂock gets scab when he does not treat
prophylactically but his/her Neighbour does (Pntt) and costs and
losses per ewe  (and her lambs) incurred if the ﬂock does get scab
(L) multiplied by the number of ewes in the ﬂock (Ne).
Cntt = Ne · L · Pntt (2)
The cost to Farmer/Neighbour when they treat prophylactically
but the other player does not (Ctnt) is the prophylaxis cost per
ewe  (and her lambs) (PC) plus the product of the probability that
a farmer’s ﬂock will get scab when he treats prophylactically but
his/her neighbour does not (Ptnt) and costs and losses per ewe (and
her lambs) incurred if the ﬂock does get scab (L), all multiplied by
the number of ewes in the ﬂock (Ne).
Ctnt = Ne · (PC + (L · Ptnt) (3)
The cost to Farmer/Neighbour when neither treats prophylacti-
cally (Cntnt) is the probability that a farmer’s ﬂock gets scab when
neither has used prophylaxis (P ), multiplied by the costs andntnt
losses per ewe  (and her lambs) incurred if the ﬂock does get scab
(L) multiplied by the number of ewes in the ﬂock (Ne).
Cntnt = Ne · L · Pntnt (4)
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Fig. 1. The decisions (quadrilaterals) of two  farmers (Farmer and Neighbour) choosing to use or not use prophylaxis for sheep scab, and the outcomes (circles) of these
decisions in a game theory model. Probability values from Table 1 were assigned to the outcomes depending on the model environment. The probability parameters of the
m of sma
F is out
g
m
2
todel were then calculated as follows: Ptt- sum of small light grey circles, Pntt- sum 
or  each outcome where Farmer’s ﬂock do get scab, subtracting the probability of th
et  scab.The four probability parameters (Ptt, Pntt, Ptnt, Pntnt) were esti-
ated based on published literature (Milne et al., 2007; Astiz et al.,
011; Rose, 2011; Rose and Wall, 2012; NOAH, 2014; Supplemen-
ary table S1). Scab transmission was considered to occur onlyll white circles, Ptnt- sum of small black circles, Pntnt- sum of small dark grey circles.
come from 1 will give the probability of an outcome where Farmer’s ﬂock does notduring the autumn and winter months when clinical infections are
most prevalent (French et al., 1999). A decision tree (Fig. 1) maps
out outcomes resulting from whether Farmer or Neighbour treats or
does not treat prophylactically and whether Farmer or Neighbour
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Table  1
Probability of possible outcomes in a game theory model where a farmer and his/her
neighbour are deciding whether to use prophylaxis for sheep scab.
Probability Dip Inject
Upland Lowland Upland Lowland
Pr(scab | treatment) 0.092 0.036 0.099 0.041
Pr(no scab | treatment) 0.908 0.964 0.901 0.959
Pr(scab | no treatment) 0.139 0.052 0.139 0.052
Pr(no scab | no treatment) 0.861 0.948 0.861 0.948
Pr(infection | neighbour infected) 0.91 0.2 0.91 0.2
Pr(healthy | neighbour infected) 0.09 0.8 0.09 0.8
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ﬂhese values were estimated using data from the literature (see supplementary
aterial) and were used along with Fig. 1 in order to estimate the values of the
robability parameters in the model.
ets scab or not. The tree was used along with Table 1 to calculate
he risk probabilities for upland and lowland farms when using an
P dip or ML  injection for all four scenarios in the model. A full
escription of the probability parameter value estimations can be
ound in the supplementary material.
.2. Costs of treatment and losses
Two treatments were considered here: an OP plunge dip with
esidual activity of 63 days and a long-acting injectable formulation
sing a macrocyclic lactone (ML) with a residual activity of 60 days.
oth could be used either as a prophylactic or a therapeutic treat-
ent of infection. There was considered to be no difference in the
ost of the product when used as a prophylactic or a therapeutic
reatment as the dosage will not differ in either case; product costs
ere obtained from veterinary wholesalers and dose rates were
ased on the manufacturer’s guidelines (NOAH, 2010; NOAH, 2014;
able 2). Flock costs were calculated for lowland and upland ﬂocks
ased on the different lambing percentages. The costs of treatment
ncluded the cost of product and labour costs (Sewell et al., 1999;
DAS, 2013; Nix, 2016; Table 2). Dipping required the added costs
f the certiﬁcate of competence (assumed to be spread over 10 years
ivided by the number of ewes to give a cost per ewe) plus dip dis-
osal costs (ADAS, 2008; Myerscough College, 2014). The costs of
nstalling and maintaining dipping facilities was not included in the
alculation. At the point of treatment, the weight of all ewes was
ssumed to be 50 kg and lambs 30 kg (EBLEX, 2014)
Losses resulting from scab infection were calculated for low-
and and upland ﬂocks as the sum of wool productivity loss, loss
n lamb sales per ewe, additional feed costs for ﬁnishing lambs
er ewe, losses due to scab-induced mortality and any therapeu-
ic treatments applied (Table 3). Extra feed costs for ﬁnishing lambs
ssumed that the average weight of lambs at sale was  38 kg (EBLEX,
014). It was anticipated that infected lambs, cull ewes and rams
ould be treated and most would make a full recovery, hence a
ow mortality rate of 0.002 was assumed for infected animals. If a
ock was infected then all individuals in the ﬂock were assumed
o be infected. There will be some heterogeneity in the severity of
nfection between individuals but the losses in wool and reproduc-
ive rate used in the model are average values and therefore the
verage was applied to all individuals in the ﬂock. If a ﬂock was not
nfected then it was assumed that no individual within the ﬂock
as infected and no losses would occur. Flocks could only become
nfected once per year.
.3. Model outcomesThe model was parameterised for four environments: a lowland
ock treating prophylactically with a long-acting ML injection, a
owland ﬂock treating prophylactically with an OP dip, an upland
ock treating prophylactically with a long-acting ML  and an uplandy Medicine 137 (2017) 43–51
ﬂock treating prophylactically with an OP dip. Within these four
environments the four prophylactic treatment scenarios described
in “Model construction and assumptions” (Eqs. (1)–(4)) were run.
The output of the model gave the losses in GBP (£) for Farmer
and his/her Neighbour. Each model run summed the costs for each
player over a one year period.
The model identiﬁed the optimum strategy which minimised
costs/losses, in each of the four prophylactic treatment scenarios
(Eqs. (1)–(4)) within each environment. If the cost to Farmer when
both Farmer and Neighbour treated prophylactically was greater
than the cost to Farmer when only Neighbour treated prophy-
lactically (Ctt > Cntt) then the optimum strategy was to not treat
prophylactically. If the cost to Farmer when only he/she treated
prophylactically was greater than the cost when neither farmer
treated prophylactically (Ctnt > Cntnt) then the strategy was to not
treat prophylactically, otherwise the optimum strategy was to treat
prophylactically. If both Ctt > Cntt and Ctnt > Cntnt, or Ctt < Cntt and
Ctnt < Cntnt (i.e. had the same optimum strategy), then the overall
strategy was described as strictly dominant. However if two dif-
ferent strategies emerged (e.g. Ctt < Cntt and Ctnt > Cntnt) then there
was no dominant strategy. The optimum strategy for the Neighbour
was calculated in the same way.
Once the optimum strategy had been found one-at-a-time
(OAAT) sensitivity analyses were undertaken on three parameters
to identify how variation on their values affected the optimum
strategy: baseline scab risk, overall prevention cost and the cost
of the prophylactic treatment product alone. Baseline risk was var-
ied from 0 to 0.5 (0% risk of scab to 50%) at 0.005 intervals. Overall
prevention cost per ewe  and her lambs was varied from £0 to £2 at
intervals of £0.05. The cost of the prophylactic treatment product
per ewe  and her lambs was also varied from 0 to £2 at intervals of
£0.05.
3. Results
3.1. Farming system
The average cost per annum of having sheep scab in a low-
land ﬂock is calculated as £40.84 per ewe  and her lambs (range
£40.63–£41.02, Table 3) and £35.12 per ewe  and her lambs in an
upland ﬂock (range £35.01–£35.38, Table 3). The minimum output
per ewe (and her lambs) is normally £59.20 for lowland ﬂocks and
£48.30 for upland ﬂocks (Nix, 2016). Prophylaxis is less expensive
for upland ﬂocks than for lowland since upland ewes have a lower
lambing percentage. It is less expensive to use an OP dip for prophy-
laxis as opposed to injection of MLs  for both upland and lowland
ﬂocks (Table 2).
For lowland farmers using a long-acting ML  injection prophylac-
tically there is a strictly dominant strategy not to use prophylaxis,
as it costs more for Farmer in the prophylaxis scenarios (Farmer
treats prophylactically and Neighbour does not, or both treat) than
in the scenarios where Farmer does not use prophylaxis (Neigh-
bour treats and Farmer does not, or neither treats) (Fig. 2). Choosing
not to treat prophylactically prevents a loss of £687 for Farmer if
Neighbour treats and £688 if Neighbour does not treat. The same
applies to treating prophylactically with an OP dip on a lowland
farm; which costs an additional £353 per annum when Neighbour
treats and £354 if Neighbour does not treat. Co-operation (both
treat) using an ML  would result in a loss of £644 each for Farmer
and Neighbour and £289 each when using a dip.
For upland farmers who use an ML,  there is also a strictly dom-
inant strategy not to use prophylaxis (Fig. 2). Prophylaxis would
cost an extra £242 per annum for Farmer if Neighbour also uses
prophylaxis and £268 if Neighbour does not. If both use prophy-
laxis, cooperation would prevent a loss of £312 for both Farmer
E.J. Nixon et al. / Preventive Veterinary Medicine 137 (2017) 43–51 47
Table  2
Estimation of prevention costs for sheep scab by injection of a long-acting macrocyclic lactone or an organophosphate dip.
Costs of prevention Lowland Upland
Injecting Cost (£) Cost (£) Sources
Cost  of long-acting ML  injection per ewe (+ lambs) £1.42 £1.37 NOAH (2014)
Labour per ewe  (+ lambs) £0.40 £0.40 ADAS (2013)
Total cost of injecting per ewe (+ lambs) £1.82 £1.77 –
Dipping – – –
Cost  of OP dipping product per ewe  (+ lambs) £0.39 £0.39 NOAH (2010)
Labour per ewe  (+ lambs) £0.86 £0.83 Sewell et al. (1999); Nix (2016)
Cost of certiﬁcate of competence per ewe  (+ lambs) £0.01 £0.01 Myerscough College (2014)
Dip disposal costs per ewe (+ lambs) £0.10 £0.11 Appendix 3, ADAS (2008)
Total cost of dipping per ewe  (+ lambs) £1.36 £1.34 –
Cost of certiﬁcate of competence is a one −off payment assumed to be valid for 10 years.
Table 3
Costs of sheep scab infestation for lowland and upland farms in the UK.
Costs of sheep scab No scab Scab Losses due to scab Source
Lowland Upland Lowland Upland Lowland Upland
Wool sales per ewe  £2.40 £1.90 £1.57 £1.24 £0.83 £0.66 Nix (2016); Rehbein et al.
(2000b)
Lambing ratio 1.7 1.6 1.29 1.2 n/a n/a Fthenakis et al. (2000); Nix
(2016)
Lamb sales per ewe £114.72 £99.20 £86.04 £74.40 £28.68 £24.80 Fthenakis et al. (2000); Nix
(2016)
Finishing food costs: – – – – – – EBLEX (2014); Hindson (2002);
Kirkwood (1980); NADIS
(2015); Rehbein et al. (2000a)
- per lamb £25.09 £23.01 £32.58 £29.88 £7.49 £6.79
-  for lambs per scabby ewe – – – – £9.67 £8.15
Lamb mortality costs per ewe £0 £0 £0.17 £0.15 £0.17 £0.15 Nix (2016)
Cull ewe and ram mortality costs £0 £0 £0.03 £0.02 £0.03 £0.02 Nix (2016)
Treatment: – – – – – – Table 2
- injection per scabby ewe (+ lambs) £0 £0 £1.82 £1.77 £1.64 £1.60
-  dip per ewe (+ lambs) £0 £0 £1.37 £1.34 £1.25 £1.23
Total loss per ewe (+ lambs) – – – – – –
Injecting – – – – £41.02 £35.38
Dipping – – – – £40.63 £35.01
Per ewe  (+ lambs) refers to costs for the ewe plus the costs for its lambs produced in a one year period (determined by the lambing ratio).
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t prophylactically using a long-acting injectable ML or an organophosphate dip, ordominant strategy (Fig. 2), since Farmer always loses less money
overall by using prophylaxis; £84 per annum if Neighbour also uses
prophylaxis and £49 if he/she does not. If Neighbour and Farmer
were to cooperate (both use prophylaxis) they would each prevent
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 loss of £727 compared to a scenario where neither player uses
rophylaxis (Fig. 2).
.2. Sensitivity analysis
For lowland farmers (both Farmer and Neighbour) using a long-
cting ML  injection there is a strictly dominant strategy to use
rophylaxis only when scab prevalence is greater than or equal
o 16% or to use an OP dip at a prevalence of greater than or equal
o 10.5% (Fig. 3). For upland farmers using a long-acting ML  injec-
ion there is a strictly dominant strategy to use prophylaxis when
cab prevalence is greater than or equal to 20.5% or to use an OP
ip when the prevalence greater than or equal to 13%.
For lowland farmers, the strictly dominant strategy not to use
rophylaxis is unaffected by the cost of the product at the range of
reatment costs examined (Fig. 4b). However, reducing the overall
revention cost (treatment plus labour) did make it economically
iable to use prophylaxis in the lowlands when this was equal to
r below £0.70 (dipping) or £0.45 (injecting) (Fig. 4a). For upland
armers, varying the treatment product cost alone was  enough to
hange the strategy, and a strategy of prophylaxis became strictly
ominant when product costs were less than or equal to £0.50 (dip)
r £0.85 (inject) per ewe and her lambs (Fig. 4b).
. Discussion
Game Theory recommends or explains decisions of individu-
ls that are affected by and have implications for the decisions
f others (Nash, 1951). It has been used previously to inform dis-
ase management, for example in salmon farming (Murray, 2014)
nd in the use of antibiotics (Porco et al., 2012). The Game Theory
odel developed here, based on data available in the literature, has
een used to identify optimum economic strategies (to treat or not
reat prophylactically for scab) in relation to the unknown strategy
f a neighbouring sheep farmer. The model developed utilises all
vailable data on the control and disease costs of scab, taking into
ccount factors such as extra ﬁnishing costs and lower reproductive
ates which have not always been included in previous estimates
Scott et al., 2007).
Not applying prophylactic treatment is a strictly dominant strat-
gy if treating prophylactically with an ML  injection on upland
arms or with a ML  or OP dip on lowland farms. This is because
rophylactic treatment costs are high relative to the risks of infec-
ion. The only situation where prophylactic treatment was a strictly
ominant strategy was for upland farmers using OP dip. However,
he savings farmers might make compared with a scenario of no
rophylactic treatment through prophylaxis are low (£84 per year
r £49 per year depending on whether the neighbour does or does
ot use prophylaxis) and therefore in practice upland farmers may
till choose not to use prophylaxis. It should also be noted that the
osts of dipping infrastructure were not included in the calculation
resented here and for farmers where such facilities were unavail-
ble, the capital costs needed for their construction would again
ake prophylactic dipping uneconomic.
Cooperation (both farmers using prophylaxis) in upland farms
lways results in a lower mean loss per farmer (Fig. 2). However,
rom a Game Theory perspective, there is still a strictly dominant
trategy to not treat prophylactically if the treatment is by injection.
his situation emulates the most common Game Theory exam-
le, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). In both
ames, no players have an incentive to deviate from their strat-
gy of non-cooperation and so, if we assume rationality, they will
ever choose to cooperate. It has already been suggested that a lack
f compliance by certain farmers during the compulsory dipping
eriod of 1972–1992 was a key reason for the failure to eradicatey Medicine 137 (2017) 43–51
sheep scab during this time and for its subsequent spread (Rose,
2011). The ﬁndings reported here suggest that non-cooperation is
an economically rational response, as also suggested by Milne et al.
(2007). Hence, if future control programs require compliance by
all farmers, economic incentives or penalties would be required to
encourage farmers to deviate from their most economically rational
strategy.
Cooperation was  still less favoured in lowland farms under
current scab prevalence since there was  a strictly dominant strat-
egy not to use prophylaxis. In fact, if both Farmer and Neighbour
co-operated in treating prophylactically the mean loss would be
greater than if neither cooperated (Fig. 2). Existing economic data
also supports the idea that it is not always economically viable to
use prophylaxis. For example, in Scotland in 2006, £5.1 million was
spent on prophylaxis while losses due to scab were estimated to
cost only £0.6 million (ADAS, 2008) (although the estimate of losses
did not take into account all the costs, for example reproductive
losses).
Although, given the most current average national prevalence
values for scab (13.9% upland and 5.2% lowland, Rose, 2011), the
current strictly dominant strategy is to only use prophylaxis if using
an OP dip on an upland farm, the sensitivity analysis demonstrates
that as the risk of scab increases this strategy changes. The pro-
phylactic use of ML  injections on upland farms becomes a strictly
dominant strategy when the prevalence is above or equal to 20.5%
and in lowland farms when the prevalence is above or equal to 16%
(Fig. 3). Dipping on lowland farms becomes strictly dominant when
the prevalence is above 10.5% (Fig. 3), with the difference between
treatment types being attributed to lower cost of dipping based on
a ﬂock of 500 ewes. These results suggest that higher prevalence
regional hotspots, with higher than average prevalence, could be
good targets for prophylaxis programs. For example, in Wales, the
prevalence has been reported to be above average at 20.5% (Rose,
2011) and at 35% (Cross et al., 2010) and therefore not only dipping,
but also injecting with a long-acting ML  at current costs-per-dose
(Table 2) would be a cost effective strategy in controlling sheep
scab. If other higher prevalence regional hotspots can be identi-
ﬁed (in either uplands or lowlands) prophylaxis might also be an
optimum strategy in these areas. Although, of course such targeted
programmes bring with them additional management, surveillance
and infrastructure costs that must be borne by central government
of distributed between individual farmers in the area.
The prevalence estimates used in our study were based on a
survey of around 400 sheep farmers in 2008 (Rose, 2011) and were
found to be similar to those from a previous survey (Bisdorff et al.,
2006). Although not completely up to date, these prevalence ﬁgures
give a good representation of what current scab risks may  be in dif-
ferent regions in Great Britain. Unfortunately, they are only able to
give prevalence estimates at a relatively crude regional scale which
limits the identiﬁcation of hotspots, although spatial models of the
distribution of reported scab outbreaks may  aid the identiﬁcation
of particularly high risk regions (Rose et al., 2009). Furthermore,
prevalence can be underestimated since farmers are often reluctant
to admit to the presence of scab in their ﬂocks (Cross et al., 2010)
or may  not report outbreaks if scab is a persistent problem within
their ﬂock or area. However, this could be overcome by the use of
the Randomised Response Technique, a method which protects the
farmers’ anonymity and appeared to result in higher estimates of
prevalence when employed in a survey by Cross et al. (2010) than
found in previous surveys. In order to collect continuous prevalence
data, media reporting methods such as the use of mobile applica-
tions could be used, as discussed by Walker (2013). More detailed
data on scab prevalence in certain regions would enable our model
to inform farmers more accurately on whether and how they should
be treating.
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Fig. 3. The change in dominant treatment strategy for upland or lowland ﬂocks exposed to different risks of sheep scab as predicted by sensitivity analysis using a game
theory  model. Dark bar – Farmer should not use prophylaxis for scab; mid-grey − no dominant strategy (mixed); light grey – Farmer should use prophylaxis for scab.
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Fig. 4. The change in dominant treatment strategy for sheep scab for upland or lowland ﬂocks in relation to variation in (a) aggregate prevention costs and (b) cost of
prophylactic treatment product only, as predicted by sensitivity analysis using a game theory model. Dark bar – Farmer should not use prophylaxis for sheep scab; mid-grey
–  no dominant strategy (mixed); light grey – Farmer should use prophylaxis for sheep scab.
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The sensitivity analysis of the cost of the prophylactic treat-
ent product demonstrated that subsidising this cost alone was not
nough to incentivise lowland farmers to use prophylaxis (Fig. 4b)
nd that the overall prevention cost (product cost plus labour costs,
ip disposal costs etc., see Table 2) would need to be less than or
qual to £0.70 (dip) or £0.45 (inject) per ewe (+ lambs) for prophy-
axis to be economically viable for lowland farmers (Fig. 4a), based
n projections for ewe output for 2016 (Nix, 2016). Although dip-
ing may  be economically viable in the uplands without subsidy,
here have been concerns relating to its potential harmful effects
o the environment and the operator, which may  prevent certain
armers from choosing this method of treatment (Sargison et al.,
007). Subsidising the cost of ML  product per ewe (+ lambs) to
0.85 or less would make it economically viable for upland farm-
rs to treat with injectable MLs  as an alternative (Fig. 4b), based on
rojections for ewe output for 2016 (Nix, 2016). Alternatively, rig-
rously applied ﬁnancial penalties would have the same economic
ffect.
Whether government would subsidise or otherwise incentivise
reventative treatment enters the realm of balancing political
gainst economic imperatives: clearly centralised management
ould bring a range of associated costs. These would include start-
p, ﬁxed or overhead costs (Tisdell, 2009) which could include
urther research costs, costs for contract negotiations, disease
urveillance costs and costs relating to the monitoring of compli-
nce and uptake (Rushton and Leonard, 2009). All of these factors
ould need to be considered in a cost-beneﬁt analysis as described
y Tisdell (2009) before instigation of such a program. There has
een debate in recent years as to whether animal health should be
een as a public or a private good and consequently whether the
overnment should have a role in providing this service (Rushton
nd Leonard, 2009).
One signiﬁcant problem with the modelling approach used here
s that it assumes that farmers are strictly rational decision mak-
rs driven by economic concerns. In reality, however, the control
f disease takes place within the entire-farm context and farm-
rs have other goals, values and inﬂuences which also affect their
ecision-making processes, such as job satisfaction, peer pressure,
nimal welfare, farm succession, maintaining a way of life, stressful
ircumstances, personality and attitude to risk (Wallace and Moss,
002; Long, 2013). The model presented here considers a Farmer
nd his/her Neighbour, each with a ﬂock of 500 ewes. The costs of
rophylactic and therapeutic treatment will vary according to ﬂock
ize (with economies of scale), and therefore the point at which pro-
hylactic treatment becomes economically viable may  vary with
ock size and predicted ewe output (e.g. Nix, 2016) in addition to
he factors explored in the sensitivity analyses. A further limitation
f this model is that it can only simulate a scenario with a single
eighbour when in reality, farmers often have multiple neighbours.
n extension of the model might consider the impact of group
ooperation and how this dynamic would change the optimum
trategy for the farmer; nevertheless the current single-neighbour
cenario is a useful ﬁrst step in this approach. A number of studies
ooking at spatial prisoner’s dilemma games have concluded that
patial structure encourages cooperation (Nowak and May, 1992;
ubermann and Glance, 1993; Nowak, 1993; Nowak et al., 1994;
illingback et al., 1999). When co-operators form clusters, the ben-
ﬁts that come from mutual cooperation make them successful
ven when exploited by defectors along the cluster boundaries
Hauert and Doebeli, 2004). Lindgren and Nordahl (1994) have
lso shown that unconditional co-operators do much better in spa-
ial prisoner dilemma games than in non-spatial. A different result
ight come from a model which looks at the problem spatially. This
ight be a good basis for coordinating a cooperative community
reating program for clustered farms in the UK.y Medicine 137 (2017) 43–51
5. Conclusions
The model outputs have shown that, given current scab preva-
lence and sheep scab treatment costs, prophylaxis employing OP
may  only be economically viable in upland farms (long-acting ML
injections may  also be cost effective in high prevalence regions
such as Wales). Using prophylaxis in lowland farms is not cost
effective. However, identifying higher prevalence regional hotspots
that could be good targets for economically viable prophylaxis pro-
grams may  be a productive approach. Only subsidising the overall
cost of prevention would incentivise lowland farmers to use pro-
phylaxis, assuming treatment choices are economically rational.
The costs associated with sheep scab control and treatment have
been estimated for both upland and lowland farms and together
with this model provide a useful insight into the underlying drivers
informing management decisions by farmers and may  help in pol-
icy formulation.
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